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Abstract
This Essay seeks to expose the complexity of the relationship between the United Kingdom
(and Ireland, but the main focus will be the UK) and the European Union that resulted from the
concessions made to the UK when the treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon were negotiated: a right
not to participate in the adoption and application of EU legislative measures in the field of Justice
and Home Affairs (”JHA”), and the right to decide on a case-by-case basis to opt into such mea-
sures, following procedures reminiscent of the sophisticated rules of cricket. These concessions
were made to allow the UK to preserve in particular the right to maintain controls on persons at
all its borders and to conduct its own immigration policies. Its discretion to opt in or opt out has
been somewhat restricted when it concerns measures belonging to or developing the “Schengen
acquis.” But that has not stopped the UK from displaying its interest in participating in some parts
of the Schengen acquis, so far mainly covering aspects of cross-border cooperation in areas of law
enforcement and criminal justice.This Essay presents the views of an optimist as to the possible
prospects of a further UK participation-in the longer run-in other parts of the Schengen acquis,
such as the EU’s external border policy, common visa policy or expulsion policy, or the rules on
free movement rights for legally residing third-country nationals.
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Cricket explained to a foreign visitor:
"You have two sides, one out in the field and one in. Each man
that's in the side that's in goes out, and when he's out he comes in and
the next man goes in until he's out. When they are all out the side that's
out comes in and the side that's been in goes out and tries to get those
coming in out. Sometimes you get men still in and not out.
* Deputy Director General of the Legal Service of General Secretariat of the
Council of the European Union. This Essay reflects personal views held by the author
and cannot be attributed to the institution he is serving.
1346
2011] UK v. EU 1347
When a man goes out to go in, the men who are out try to get him
out, and when he is out he goes in and the next man in goes out and
goes in. There are two men called umpires who stay all out all the time,
and they decide when the men who are in are out. When both sides have
been in and both sides have been out, including those who are not out,
that is the end of the game.'
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important achievements of the Treaty of
Amsterdam was the integration of a body of law, commonly
referred to as "the Schengen acquis," into the framework of the
European Union ("EU" or "Union").2
This body of law3 constituted the realization of an objective
of European integration that was of paramount importance: the
free movement of persons within the area comprising the
territories, in Europe, of all the Member States of the European
Community ("Community"), without being submitted to border
controls. This objective, one of the four fundamental freedoms
to be ensured in order to construct the internal market and let it
function,4 could not be realized at that time, due to a
1. An Englishman Knocked for Six by Ireland's Win? That's Cricket, IRISH TIMES
(Dublin), Mar. 5, 2011, at Weekend 4 (quoting a famous description of cricket that
originally appeared on a British tea towel).
2. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340/1
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]; Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol Integrating the
Schengen Acquis into the Framework of the European Union, 1997 O.J. C 340/93
[hereinafter Schengen Protocol].
3. For a complete compilation of the Schengen acquis at the time of its integration
into the European Union ("EU" or "Union"), see The Schengen Acquis, 2000 0.J. L
239/1.
4. With the Single European Act of 1986, the four freedoms were introduced in
Article 8A of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC
Treaty"): "The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." The deadline for realizing the
establishment of the internal market was set for December 31, 1992. Single European
Act, 1987 O.J. L 169/1 (amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]). With the
successive treaty amendments, Article 8A EEC became Article 7a EC, Article 14 EC and,
at present, Article 26 TFEU. See EEC Treaty, supra, art. 8A; Consolidated Version of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 14, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37 [hereinafter
EC Treaty]; Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, 1997 O.J. C 340/1, at 86; Consolidated
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fundamental difference of view between the Member States as to
its implications for the existing regimes of checks on persons
when crossing borders between Member States.
If free movement of nationals of Member States, of "citizens
of the Union," was a generally acceptable concept, different views
emerged regarding the consequences of their rights of free
movement for third-country nationals. Most Member States
argued that since free movement of EU citizens implied the right
not to be controlled at internal borders,5 there was no other
option than to completely abolish these controls not only for EU-
citizens but also for third-country nationals.
Ireland and the United Kingdom argued differently: since
the free movement rights were limited to EU citizens, border
controls in relation to third-country nationals had to be
retained.6 In fact, they saw no other option than to retain
internal border controls for all persons in order to ascertain
whether persons presenting themselves at the border are indeed
EU citizens, in which case no further checks would be necessary,
or third-country nationals subject to specific entry conditions.7
This Essay seeks to expose the complexity of the relationship
between the United Kingdom (and Ireland, but the main focus
will be the UK) and the European Union that resulted from the
concessions made to the UK when the treaties of Amsterdam and
Lisbon were negotiated: a right not to participate in the adoption
and application of EU legislative measures in the field of Justice
and Home Affairs ("JHA"), and the right to decide on a case-by-
case basis to opt into such measures, following procedures
reminiscent of the sophisticated rules of cricket. These
concessions were made to allow the UK to preserve in particular
the right to maintain controls on persons at all its borders and to
conduct its own immigration policies. Its discretion to opt in or
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 26, 2010 0.J. C
83/47, at 58 [hereinafter TFEU].
5. "Internal borders" are crossed whenever someone moves from one Member
State to another, irrespective of the means of transport used, without passing through
the territory of a state which is not part of the Schengen area. See Schengen Acquis, supra
note 3, art. 1, 2000 0.J. L 239, at 19.
6. Protocol on the Application of Certain Aspects of Article 7a of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community to the United Kingdom and to Ireland art. 1,
1997 O.J. C 340/97.
7. Id. art. 2.
opt out has been somewhat restricted when it concerns measures
belonging to or developing the "Schengen acquis." But that has
not stopped the UK from displaying its interest in participating in
some parts of the Schengen acquis, so far mainly covering aspects
of cross-border cooperation in areas of law enforcement and
criminal justice.
This Essay presents the views of an optimist as to the possible
prospects of a further UK participation-in the longer run-in
other parts of the Schengen acquis, such as the EU's external
border policy, common visa policy or expulsion policy, or the
rules on free movement rights for legally residing third-country
nationals.
I. HISTORYAND BACKGROUND OF THE SCHENGENACQUIS
The history of "Schengen" is well known. Since, due to this
unsolvable dispute, the Community was not able to advance, a
number of Member States began alleviating checks on persons at
their common borders and embarked on negotiations with a view
to establishing a common system of abolition of checks at
common internal borders and a common regime for exercising
controls at their external borders. France and Germany took the
lead in 1984,8 and the Benelux countries, which had already
decided in 1960 to abolish controls on persons at their common
borders,9 joined immediately.
In 1985, these five Member States defined their short-term
actions and long-term intentions in the Schengen Agreement of
14 June.10 Negotiations started forthwith, with a view toward
8. This initiative was launched immediately after the meeting of the European
Council in Fontainebleau onJune 25-26, 1984, which called for putting in hand without
delay a study of measures which could be taken in any case before the middle of 1985,
including "the abolition of police and customs formalities for people and goods crossing
intra-Community frontiers." Agreement between the Governments of the States of the
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic
on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, pmbl., art. 1, 2000 O.J. L
239/13, at 13.
9. Convention on the Transfer of Controls of Persons to the External Borders of
the Benelux Territory arts. 2, 3, Apr. 11, 1960, 374 U.N.T.S. 3.
10. The symbolic location of this tiny village, at the place where the territories of
France, Germany, and the Benelux meet, was chosen, not only for the signature of the
1985 agreement but also for that of its implementing convention in 1990. Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of
the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
UK v. EU 13492011]
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establishing detailed, binding rules governing the suppression of
border checks at their common borders and all the necessary
"flanking" or "compensatory" measures to be taken in
consequence thereof. After four-and-a-half years of negotiations
and half a year waiting to see what the fall of the Berlin Wall
would bring, the Convention Implementing the Schengen
Agreement was signed on June 19, 1990.11 The convention
consisted of 142 articles, a Final Act, and a number of
declarations. The right of free movement was expressed in
Article 2(1) in sixteen words: "Internal borders may be crossed at
any point without any checks on persons being carried out."12
The rest of the convention and all the implementing and other
decisions that would be adopted subsequently through the
institutional framework set up by the convention 3 consist of
"flanking" measures required to enable this right to function.
These flanking measures concerned such matters as: (1)
common rules for the organization of controls and surveillance
at the external borders; 4 (2) the creation of a common visa
policy with the introduction of a uniform visa, valid for the entire
"Schengen territory," a harmonized list of countries whose
nationals need visas and of countries whose nationals do not,15
and a first endeavour to organize consular cooperation in visa
French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 2000
O.J. L 239/19 [hereinafter Implementing Convention].
11. Id.
12. Id. art. 2(1), at 20.
13. The convention created (or rather confirmed the existence of) an Executive
Committee at the ministerial level, which met regularly and to which several High Level
Groups, managing the work of numerous working groups, reported. In order to avoid a
complete duplication of the model and working structures of the EC "Council," the
Schengen "Executive Committee" decided to meet at the level, not of ministers, but of
state secretaries (junior ministers). See id. arts. 131-33, at 52.
14. See id. art. 6, at 21.
15. A full harmonization of these lists was only achieved after the integration of the
acquis into the framework of the Union. For some years the Schengen states have
operated three lists: a "white," a "black," and a "grey" list, the latter containing a factual
description of third states in respect of whose nationals some Schengen states retained
an obligation to have a visa when entering their country, and other Schengen states did
not. See Decision of the Executive Committee on the Abolition of the Grey List of States
Whose Nationals Are Subject to the Visa Requirement by Certain Schengen States, 2000
0.J. L 239/206 (abolishing the grey list).
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matters; 6 (3) the free-movement rights of legally residing third-
country nationals based on their residence permits;" (4) a
shared responsibility for the removal of third-country nationals
who do not fulfil the conditions for legal stay;'8 (5) uniform rules
on common-carrier liability when bringing inadmissible third-
country nationals to or across the external border; 9 (6) a system
aimed at sharing responsibility for dealing with asylum
applications;20 (7) provisions on cross-border police cooperation,
including cross-border hot pursuit and cross-border
surveillance;21 (8) rules supplementing existing arrangements on
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, extradition and the
transfer of the enforcement of criminal judgments;22 (9)
harmonized provisions on the cross-border application of the ne
bis in idem principle;23 (10) provisions on common action against
illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and common rules on control
16. See generally Decision of the Executive Committee of 28 April 1999 on the
Definitive Versions of the Common Manual and the Common Consular Instructions,
2000 O.J. L 239/317.
17. See Implementing Convention, supra note 10, arts. 19-21, 2000 O.J. L 239, at
23-24.
18. See id. arts. 22-24, at 24.
19. See id. arts. 26-27, at 25.
20. See id. arts. 28-38, at 25-28. This system, at present known as the "Dublin
system," was originally conceived as a matter related to the abolition of checks at
internal borders and the construction of a single area in which, on the one hand, asylum
seekers cannot seek asylum in every Member State belonging to that area, but on the
other hand, have the guarantee that there will always be a Member State responsible for
dealing with their applications. However, it had been decided already in 1995 to make
this system the object of a legal instrument applicable to all the Member States including
the UK and Ireland, first as a "third pillar" convention, signed in Dublin (hence the
reference), see Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining
Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European
Communities, 1997 O.J. C 254/1, and later, under the Amsterdam Treaty, as a
Regulation, replacing the convention (but not the reference to "Dublin"). Council
Regulation 343/2003/EC Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the
Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in One of the
Member States by a Third-Country National, 2003 O.J. L 50/1. A link between the
Schengen acquis and the "Dublin system" has been retained for the states that became
associated with the Schengen acquis (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland).
Their association with "Schengen" was made conditional on their simultaneous
association with the "Dublin" acquis. See The Schengen Area and Cooperation, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/legislationsummaries/justice-freedom-security/free-movementof_
persons-asylumimmigration/133020_en.htm (last updated Aug. 3, 2009).
21. See Implementing Convention, supra note 10, arts. 39-47, 2000 0.J. L 239, at
28-34.
22. See id. arts. 48-53, 59-69, at 34-35, 36-38.
23. See id. arts. 54-58, at 35-36.
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of firearms and ammunition;24 (11) the setting up of a common
information system, the Schengen Information System ("SIS"),
which would store alerts on persons who either should not be
allowed to enter the Schengen territory or should be removed
when found within the territory, persons to arrest with a view to
their extradition, persons whose whereabouts should be
reported, and alerts on various categories of stolen or missing
objects (cars, firearms, identity documents, banknotes, etc.);25
(12) a complete set of rules on data protection related to the
functioning of the SIS, as well as rules on data protection for
other forms of exchange of personal data pursuant to the
convention;26 (13) some marginal provisions on transport and
movement of goods;27 and (14) an institutional framework for
allowing common implementing measures to be taken by the
Executive Committee, consisting of representatives of the
contracting parties at the ministerial level, whose decisions were
prepared by a large number of committees and working and
experts groups, assisted by a special "Schengen secretariat"
hosted by the secretariat of the Benelux Economic Union.28
The convention entered into force in 1995 after the
fulfilment of the constitutional requirements in the five
contracting states and after the SIS was developed and
operational.29 In the meantime, other EC Member States had
indicated their wish to accede to the convention. To that end,
accession protocols were negotiated and signed with Italy, with
Portugal and Spain, with Greece and Austria and with Denmark,
Sweden and Finland.30
The Executive Committee, enlarged with members from the
acceding states, started adopting a wide range of decisions in
most of the areas covered by the convention.
24. See id. arts. 70-91, at 38-42.
25. See id. arts. 90, 95, at 42-43.
26. See id. arts. 101-18, 126-30, at 45-48, 50-52.
27. See id. arts. 120-25, at 49-50.
28. See id. arts. 131-33, at 52.
29. See Decision of the Executive Committee of 22 December 1994 on Bringing
into Force the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 19 June 1990,
2000 0.J. L 239/130, at 131.
30. See generally Schengen acquis, supra note 3, 2000 0.J. L 239, at 63-123
(agreements of the accession of states).
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II. THE INTEGRATION OF THE SCHENGENACQUIS INTO
THE EU FRAMEWORK
The negotiations for amendments to the Treaty Establishing
the European Community and the Treaty on European Union
("TEU") as established by the Treaty of Maastricht started in
1995 and led to the signature in 1997 of the Treaty of
Amsterdam.3' The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on
May 1, 1999. It brought important innovations in the field of
Justice and Home Affairs. First, several areas that were previously
within the scope of the "third pillar" became matters of
competence of the Community ("first pillar"). This was in
particular the case of the organization of controls on persons at
external borders, the free movement rights of third-country
nationals, the policy on short term visas, asylum, legal and illegal
immigration, private international law, and judicial cooperation
in civil matters. Police cooperation and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters remained within the EU's competence under
the "third pillar."32
Second, for three Member States, protocols were
introduced, allowing them not to participate in the Community's
action in the JHA fields for which competence had been
transferred to the Community.33 For Denmark, this exclusion was
categorical; for the UK and Ireland it was not: they had the right
to decide on a case-by-case basis whether they wanted to
participate in the Council of the European Union's ("Council")
adoption of binding acts in these areas or in such acts after their
adoption ("opt in").34
Third, a separate protocol regulated the integration of the
Schengen acquis into the EU framework by allowing the Member
States that had so far been involved in the creation, development,
and application of that acquis outside the EU, to continue to do
so within the legal framework of the EU as a matter of "closer
cooperation," a concept that had also been introduced by the
31. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 2, 1997 O.J. C 340.
32. Id. art 1(11), at 16.
33. Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the Position of Denmark, 1997 O.J. C
340/101 [hereinafter Denmark Position Protocol]; Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on
the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, 1997 O.J. C 340/99 [hereinafter UK
and Ireland Position Protocol].
34. UK and Ireland Position Protocol, supra note 33, arts. 1-8, 1997 0.J. C 340, at
100.
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Treaty of Amsterdam.35 In order to allow for a fast and smooth
transition, this protocol created a number of specific legal bases
for the adoption of measures, such as a comprehensive definition
of the acts constituting the Schengen acquis,36 the determination
of the legal bases of those acts corresponding to the relevant
provisions of the EU and EC treaties as amended by the Treaty of
Amsterdam (rather than their re-adoption), with a view to the
eventual modification of those acts, 7 the conclusion of an
association agreement with Iceland and Norway,38 and the
integration of the secretariat of the Schengen cooperation into
the administrative structures of the EU.39
Thus, the abolition of checks at internal borders and the
putting into effect of the entire Schengen acquis, which had
already been realized before May 1, 1999 for France, Germany,
the Benelux states, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Austria, has been
decided after that date by the EU for Greece, the three Nordic
Member States plus Norway and Iceland, and, after their
accession to the Union, for nine out of ten of the Member States
that acceded in 2004. Such a decision is expected in 2011 for the
Member States that acceded to the EU in 2007.
Denmark, which had been allowed by the Protocol on the
Position of Denmark, to remain excluded from the Community's
legislation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, but which is
committed to participating in the Schengen acquis after its
integration into the EU framework, has accepted the obligation
of implementing acts of the Community developing the
Schengen acquis "as an obligation under international law." 40
III. THE SPECIAL POSITION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
IRELAND UNDER THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM
The protocol on the integration of the Schengen acquis into
the EU framework resolved the issue that had kept the UK and
35. Schengen Protocol, supra note 2, 1997 O.J. C 340.
36. Council Decision No. 1999/435/EC, 1999 O.J. L 176/1, [l 1-4.
37. Council Decision No. 1999/436/EC, 1999 O.J. L 176/17, 1 3.
38. Agreement Signed on 18 May 1999 with the Republic of Iceland and the
Kingdom of Norway Concerning the Latter's Association with the Implementation,
Application and Development of the Schengen Acquis, 1999 O.J. L 176/36; see also
Council Decision No. 1999/437/EC, O.J. L 176/31.
39. Council Decision No. 1999/307/EC (Schengen Secretariat), 1999 O.J. L 119/49.
40. Denmark Position Protocol, supra note 33, art. 5, 1997 Oj. C 340, at 102.
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Ireland divided from the other Member States. It excluded the
UK and Ireland ab initio from the Schengen cooperation and
recognized that these two Member States could continue to
exercise border checks on persons, be they EU citizens or third-
country nationals wishing to enter their territories while coming
directly from another Member State. 41 However, in conformity
with the underlying philosophy of closer cooperation, the
protocol had a specific provision on the position of the UK and
Ireland to allow them to take part in "some or all" of the
provisions of the Schengen acquis and in proposals and initiatives
to build upon that acquis.42 The procedures for authorizing such
an "opt in" were, however, different from those set out in the
Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland and
also different from the general treaty provisions on closer
cooperation. And Article 7 of the Protocol on the Position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland makes it clear that the opt-in
provisions of the Schengen Protocol prevail.43
According to Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol, the
Council shall decide on a request from the UK or Ireland with
the unanimity of its members participating in the reinforced
Schengen cooperation and of the representative of the
government of the requesting state.44 This procedure applies to
requests to take part in provisions of the Schengen acquis in
which the requesting state (UK or Ireland) does not yet
participate.
Although Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol is admittedly
perhaps not the clearest article of the treaty, it states first that acts
of the Schengen acquis adopted before its integration into the
framework of the Union can only be modified or be further
developed through acts of the Union (or Community), to be
adopted in accordance with the procedures set out in the EC
Treaty and the TEU.45 With respect to the UK and Ireland,
Article 5 addresses only their participation in modifications or
developments of the parts of the Schengen acquis in which those
states take part by virtue of a decision of the Council under
41. Schengen Integration Protocol, supra note 2, art. 4, 1997 O.J. C 340, at 95.
42. Id. pmbl., art. 7, at 93, 94.
43. UK and Ireland Position Protocol, supra note 33, art. 7, 1997 O.J. C 340, at 100.
44. Id. art. 4, at 95.
45. Id. art. 5, at 94.
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Article 4 of the protocol. This interpretation has been confirmed
by the Court of Justice of the European Union ("Court of
Justice").46
Immediately after the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam the government of the UK presented in two separate
letters a request under Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol to
participate in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis. The
Council decided on the request in its Decision of May 29, 2000,
in which it authorized the UK, after having emphasized in the
recitals the importance of preserving the coherence of the
various parts constituting the Schengen acquis, to participate in
the following parts of the acquis- (1) most of the provisions on
police cooperation, with the exception, for instance, of cross-
border hot pursuit; (2) the provisions on mutual legal assistance
in criminal matters, extradition, and transfer of the enforcement
of criminal judgments; (3) the provisions on ne bis in idem; (4)
the provisions on narcotic drugs; (5) the provisions on data
protection applicable to the exchange of data pursuant to the
above provisions; (6) the provisions on measures against
commercial carriers transporting third-country nationals whose
entry is refused and on measures against facilitating, for financial
gain, the illegal entry and stay of immigrants; and (7) the
provisions on the SIS, with the exception of those which are
related to alerts regarding third-country nationals for the
purposes of refusing entry to the territory of the Member States.47
This decision confirmed the logic of the solution that the
Schengen Protocol found regarding the diverging views of the
UK and Ireland on the implications of the right of free
movement of persons: the UK and Ireland can, at their request,
participate in measures that have been designed for the other
Member States as measures flanking, compensating, and counter-
46. United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland v. Council, Case C-77/05,
[2007] E.C.R. 1-11,495, 1 68 [hereinafter U.K v. Council I] ("[T]he interpretation of
the second subparagraph of Article 5(1) of the Schengen Proposal (sic) put forward by
the United Kingdom cannot be accepted and that provision must be understood as
applicable only to proposals and initiatives to build upon an area of the Schengen acquis
which the United Kingdom and/or Ireland have been authorised to take part in
pursuant to Article 4 of that protocol."); United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Council, Case C-137/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-11,593, 50 [hereinafter U.K. v.
Council II].
47. Council Decision No. 2000/365/EC (UK and Schengen acquis) art. 1, 2000 0.J.
L 131/43, at 45.
balancing the suppression of checks on persons when crossing
their common borders, without being required to abolish
frontier controls as such.
Whereas the test for binding Iceland and Norway (and,
since 2007, Switzerland, which became likewise associated with
the implementation, application, and development of the
Schengen acquis)4 8 to the measures of the Union that develop the
Schengen acquis requires the demonstration that such measures
are inextricably linked to, and indeed necessary as a consequence
of, the abolition of checks at internal borders, 49 no such test can
be relied on when deciding on requests from the UK and Ireland
to take part in certain areas of the Schengen acquis. Indeed, their
entitlement to retain controls at their frontiers, also in respect of
citizens of Member States and their dependants has been
explicitly enacted in the Protocol on the Application of Certain
Aspects of Article 14 (ex Article 7a) Treaty Establishing the
European Community (now Article 26 TFEU) to the UK and
Ireland.50
In 2004, the Council decided to put into effect for the UK
the provisions of the Schengen acquis covered by its Decision of
May 29, 2000, except for the provisions related to the SIS.51 With
respect to the latter, the UK preferred to await the creation of
the successor of the SIS, SIS II, in order to directly join the new
system.5 2 Unfortunately, SIS II has been the victim of significant
delays, and it is not expected to be operational before the first
quarter of 2013.53
48. C.f Agreement between the European Union, the European Communities and
the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's Association with the
Implementation, Application and Development of the Schengen Acquis, 2008 O.J. L
53/52.
49. C.f Council of the European Union, How to Decide whether a Particular
Subject Matter Is "Schengen Related" and Has to Be Dealt with through "Mixed
Committee" Procedures? Council Doc. No. 12164/99, 1 8 (Oct. 22, 1999).
50. 1997 O.J. C 340/97; Protocol on the Application of Certain Aspects of Article
26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to the United Kingdom and
to Ireland, 2010 O.J. C 83/293.
51. Council Decision No. 2004/926/EC (UK and Schengen), 2004 O.J. L 395/70,
2.
52. Id. 1 3; see Q&A: Schengen Agreement, BBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4 7 38063.stm.
53. European Commission, Report on the Global Schedule and Budge for the
Entry into Operation of the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II),
SEC(2010) 1138 Final (Sept. 2010).
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In 2001 Ireland made a request similar to that of the UK
under Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol. The Council acted on
that request through its Decision of February 28, 2002.54 None of
the provisions for which the Council authorized Ireland to take
part has been put into effect for Ireland as of yet.
Another provision of the Council's Decision deals with
proposals and initiatives developing the parts of the Schengen
acquis in which the UK has been authorized to participate and
reads as follows:
From the date of adoption of this Decision the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall be
deemed irrevocably to have notified the President of the
Council under Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol that it
wishes to take part in all proposals and initiatives which build
upon the Schengen acquis referred to in Article 1. Such
participation shall cover the territories referred to in Article
5(1) and (2) respectively, to the extent that the proposals
and initiatives build upon the provisions of the Schengen
acquis to which those territories become bound.55
The Council's concern to preserve the integrity of the
Schengen acquis and of the parts of it in which the Council had
authorized the UK to participate led the Council to take the
precaution of specifying that this integrity would not be affected
by unilateral decisions of the UK not to take part in further
developments, with the risk of rendering Schengen cooperation
in these areas inoperable.
IV. THE SPECIAL POSITION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
IRELAND RESTA TED UNDER THE TREATY OF LISBON
Although this provision was obviously a price that the UK
had to pay for being authorized to partially take part in the
Schengen acquis, it took the opportunity of the next modification
of the Treaties, particularly the negotiations that lead to the
Lisbon Treaty, to try to undo the effects of Article 8(2) and allow
the UK to have a free choice of opting in or staying out of
measures that develop the parts of the Schengen acquis by which
it was bound.
54. Council Decision No. 2002/192/EC, 2002 O.J. L 64/20.
55. Council Decision No. 2000/365/EC, art 8(2), 2000 O.J. L 131/43.
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The UK did not attempt to modify the relationship between
Articles 4 and 5 of the protocol, in effect allowing the UK to opt
into measures that built upon parts of the Schengen acquis in
which the UK had not been authorized to take part. Such an
interpretation of Article 5 of the protocol had been
unequivocally rejected by the Court of Justice in 2007 when it
upheld the decisions of the Council to refuse the participation of
the UK in the Council's adoption of the Regulation establishing
the Agency for the Management of the Union's External Borders
("FRONTEX") and of the Regulation Introducing Biometric
Data in Passports of EU Citizens.56 These regulations constituted
developments of the Schengen acquis in the field of the
organization of controls at external borders, a part of that acquis
in which the UK had not previously requested and been
authorized to take part.
More recently, the Court again rejected an application by
the UK for annulment of a Framework Decision regulating the
access of law enforcement authorities of the Member States to
data stored in the Visa Information System ("VIS"). 7 The UK
had not participated in the Council's adoption of this Framework
Decision since the Council considered it a measure that built
upon the Schengen acquis in the area of visa policy.
Notwithstanding the argument that the Framework Decision was
based on "third pillar provisions" on police cooperation, the
Court shared the reasoning of the Council and made the UK's
right to participate in the Framework Decision dependent on a
prior authorization by the Council, pursuant to Article 4 of the
Schengen Protocol, to participate in the Union's visa policy and,
consequently, in the VIS.5 8
Most recently, the UK has decided to follow that route in
order to be able to participate in the adoption of the proposed
regulation that would create an agency for the management of
several EU information systems, e.g., the VIS, the SIS (in fact SIS
II as soon as it becomes operational), and Eurodac.5 9 To the
extent that the agency is to be made responsible for managing
56. See generally UK v. Council II, Case C-137/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-11,593; U.K v.
Council I, Case C-77/05, (2007] E.C.R. 1-11,459.
57. United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland v. Council, Case C-
482/08, [2010] E.C.R. I_ (delivered Oct. 26, 2010) (not yet reported).
58. Id. It 2-4.
59. Council Decision No. 2010/779/EU, 2010 O.J. L 333/58.
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the VIS and the entire SIS, its enacting legislation will constitute
a development of the Schengen acquis, covering matters in which
the UK has not been authorized to take part (the VIS and part of
the SIS). Consequently, the UK has made a request to the
Council pursuant to Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol to be
authorized to take part, for those parts, in the adoption of the
regulation establishing the agency; its participation for the other
parts follows from Article 8(2) of Council Decision 2000/365/EC
(for the "law enforcement" part of SIS) and from an opt-in in
respect of the Eurodac aspects, which do not belong to the
Schengen acquis. The Council decided to grant the UK's
request.60
The last-minute negotiations leading to the Treaty of Lisbon
have introduced considerable modifications to Article 5 of the
Schengen Protocol, now five paragraphs instead of two. The text
reads as follows:
Article 5
1. Proposals and initiatives to build upon the Schengen
acquis shall be subject to the relevant provisions of the
Treaties.
In this context, where either Ireland or the United Kingdom
has not notified the Council in writing within a reasonable
period that it wishes to take part, the authorisation referred
to in Article 329 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union shall be deemed to have been granted to
the Member States referred to in Article 1 and to Ireland or
the United Kingdom where either of them wishes to take
part in the areas of cooperation in question.
2. Where either Ireland or the United Kingdom is deemed to
have given notification pursuant to a decision under Article
4, it may nevertheless notify the Council in writing, within 3
months, that it does not wish to take part in such a proposal
or initiative. In that case, Ireland or the United Kingdom
shall not take part in its adoption. As from the latter
notification, the procedure for adopting the measure
building upon the Schengen acquis shall be suspended until
the end of the procedure set out in paragraphs 3 or 4 or
60. Id.
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until the notification is withdrawn at any moment during
that procedure.
3. For the Member State having made the notification
referred to in paragraph 2, any decision taken by the Council
pursuant to Article 4 shall, as from the date of entry into
force of the proposed measure, cease to apply to the extent
considered necessary by the Council and under the
conditions to be determined in a decision of the Council
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission. That decision shall be taken in accordance with
the following criteria: the Council shall seek to retain the
widest possible measure of participation of the Member State
concerned without seriously affecting the practical
operability of the various parts of the Schengen acquis, while
respecting their coherence. The Commission shall submit its
proposal as soon as possible after the notification referred to
in paragraph 2. The Council shall, if needed after convening
two successive meetings, act within four months of the
Commission proposal.
4. If, by the end of the period of four months, the Council
has not adopted a decision, a Member State may, without
delay, request that the matter be referred to the European
Council. In that case, the European Council shall, at its next
meeting, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission, take a decision in accordance with the
criteria referred to in paragraph 3.
5. If, by the end of the procedure set out in paragraphs 3 or
4, the Council or, as the case may be, the European Council
has not adopted its decision, the suspension of the
procedure for adopting the measure building upon the
Schengen acquis shall be terminated. If the said measure is
subsequently adopted[,] any decision taken by the Council
pursuant to Article 4 shall, as from the date of entry into
force of that measure, cease to apply for the Member State
concerned to the extent and under the conditions decided
by the Commission, unless the said Member State has
withdrawn its notification referred to in paragraph 2 before
the adoption of the measure. The Commission shall act by
the date of this adoption. When taking its decision, the
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Commission shall respect the criteria referred to in
paragraph 3.61
This text goes together with not less than four declarations
annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference
that adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, which read as follows:
44. Declaration on Article 5 of the Protocol on the Schengen
acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union
The Conference notes that where a Member State has made
a notification under Article 5(2) of the Protocol on the
Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the
European Union that it does not wish to take part in a
proposal or initiative, that notification may be withdrawn at
any moment before the adoption of the measure building
upon the Schengen acquis.
45. Declaration on Article 5(2) of the Protocol on the
Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the
European Union
The Conference declares that whenever the United
Kingdom or Ireland indicates to the Council its intention not
to participate in a measure building upon a part of the
Schengen acquis in which it participates, the Council will
have a full discussion on the possible implications of the non-
participation of that Member State in that measure. The
discussion within the Council should be conducted in the
light of the indications given by the Commission concerning
the relationship between the proposal and the Schengen
acquas.
46. Declaration on Article 5(3) of the Protocol on the
Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the
European Union
The Conference recalls that if the Council does not take a
decision after a first substantive discussion of the matter, the
Commission may present an amended proposal for a further
substantive re-examination by the Council within the
deadline of 4 months.
61. Consolidated Versions of the TFEU & TEU, Protocol (No. 19) on the Schengen
Acquis Integrated into the Framework of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/290.
47. Declaration on Article 5(3), (4) and (5) of the Protocol
on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the
European Union
The Conference notes that the conditions to be determined
in the decision referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article 5
of the Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the
framework of the European Union may determine that the
Member State concerned shall bear the direct financial
consequences, if any, necessarily and unavoidably incurred as
a result of the cessation of its participation in some or all of
the acquis referred to in any decision taken by the Council
pursuant to Article 4 of the said Protocol.62
Here is a summary of the operation of these provisions
explained to a foreign visitor: First the UK is out, but it can
request to be in, and when authorized, it is in. For proposals
building on where it is in, it is deemed to be in, but it may notify
its wish to be out, in which case it is out unless it withdraws its
notification, in which case it is in. If it notifies its wish to be out, it
is out of the whole game if that is so decided by the other players.
But the other players should discuss the matter seriously and try
to keep it in, so that it can remain in while it is out. If they do not
know what to do, another team of players may be brought in. If
that team cannot decide whether it is in or out, it shall be out,
unless it withdraws its wish to be out, in which case it is in again.
But when it is definitively out, it shall pay a round of beer to all
the other players. How's that?63 It is clear that one has to know
the rules of cricket64 in order to understand how these
procedures would work.
V. FOUR SCENARIOS FOR A POSSIBLE WIDER UK
PARTICIPATIONIN THE SCHENGENACQUIS
The UK has repeatedly indicated its interest in participating
in measures developing the Schengen acquis without being
62. Declaration Annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference
which Adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2008 O.J. C 115/335, at 352.
63. "An appeal 'How's That?' covers all ways of being out." MARYLEBONE CRICKET
CLUB, THE LAWS OF CRICKET 61 (2003), available at http://www.lords.org/data/files/
laws of cricket 2003-8685.pdf.
64. "There is a widely held and quite erroneous belief that cricket is just another
game." See CRICKETING: CULTURES IN CONFLICT: WORLD CUP 198 (Boria Majumdar &
J.A. Mangan eds., 2004) (quoting the Duke of Edinburgh).
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willing to accept the underlying acquis. In fact, this was the case
with the FRONTEX agency, to whose activities it wished to
contribute in the same way as the other Member States rather
than having an observer status in its management board. It was
also the case with the measures introducing biometric data in
EU-citizen passports, which were based on the EC Treaty's
provisions on the organization of controls on persons at external
borders. Likewise, the UK was interested in letting its law
enforcement authorities have direct access to data held in the
VIS while being prepared to let the law enforcement authorities
of the other Member States have direct access to the UK's visa
database.
It is also interested in participating in the establishment of
the agency responsible for the management and technical
development of EU information technology ("IT") systems in the
field of Justice and Home Affairs, while realizing that this agency
would become responsible for the management of some IT
systems that were set up as developments of parts of the
Schengen acquis in which the UK does not take part. And it has
found its way to be allowed to do so.
One may expect that in the foreseeable future, other
common IT systems that will be considered as developments of
the Schengen acquis will be set up, such as an entry/exit system
(EES) for third-country nationals when entering the EU for short
stays of up to three months, a registered travellers program
(RTP) for allowing groups of frequent travellers from third
countries to enter the EU, subject to appropriate pre-screening,
using simplified border checks at automated gates, and a
European system of travel authorization (ESTA) for third-country
nationals who are not subject to visa requirements.65 Clearly, such
systems would serve the Union's objectives in the field of external
border management and controls and could become accessible
to the UK only, if it took part in the Union's policy in that area.
There are temptations galore, which begs the question
whether there are areas of the Schengen acquis in which the UK
might be able to participate, other than those in which it already
takes part, without giving up the right of retaining checks on all
65. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: Information Management in the Area of
Freedom, Security andJustice, COM (2010) 385 Final (July 2010), at 20-21.
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persons at its borders who want to enter the territory of the UK
from another Member State (other than Ireland), a right
guaranteed in the Protocol on the Application of Article 26
TFEU to the United Kingdom and Ireland. 66
The remainder of this Essay will be dedicated to an analysis
of this question and of the consequences of different possible
answers. For reasons of simplicity it focuses on the UK, but the
analysis should be understood as covering Ireland as well. The
existence of a "common travel area" comprising these two
Member States will make it impossible in practice for the one to
participate in any of those areas of the Schengen acquis without
the other doing the same.67
The Schengen member states, and indeed the treaties, have
accepted that the UK and Ireland can participate in measures
that have been and are considered to be measures "flanking" or
"compensating" the core asset of the Schengen acquis, i.e. the
suppression of checks on persons when crossing internal borders,
without ever being obliged to accept this core asset itself. The UK
and Ireland are thus in a unique position, since no other
Member State and no state acceding to the Union has the right
to claim the same treatment. Indeed, Article 7 of the Schengen
Protocol states: "For the purposes of the negotiations for the
admission of new Member States into the European Union, the
Schengen acquis and further measures taken by the institutions
within its scope shall be regarded as an acquis which must be
accepted in full by all States candidates for admission." 68 But the
special position of the UK and Ireland in relation to the
Schengen acquis would allow for further Council decisions
rendering parts of that acquis applicable to them other than
those already covered by the Council Decisions of 2000 and 2010
(for the UK) and 2002 (for Ireland).
66. See sources cited supra note 50.
67. See Paiaras Mac Einrf, The Implications for Ireland and the UK Arising from the
Development of Recent EU Policy on Migration, in MIGRATION POLICY IN IRELAND (2002),
available at http://migration.ucc.ie/schengencta.htm. This would be different if ideas
floated from time to time to bring an end to the common travel area would materialize.
See Passport Checks Clause Defeated, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk news/northern ireland/797791 1.stm.
68. Consolidated Versions of the TFEU & TEU, Protocol (No. 19) on the
Schengen Acquis Integrated into the Framework of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83,
at 290; Schengen Protocol, supra note 2, art. 8, 1997 O.J. C. 340, at 96.
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And here one could consider four scenarios.
A. First Scenario: External Borders Policy
One scenario might be that the UK decides to take part in
the provisions of the Schengen acquis on external borders, i.e.,
the rules governing the way in which controls are to be exercised
on persons entering the UK from a non-Schengen state and
when leaving from the UK to a non-Schengen state. This would
imply that the UK would exercise controls not only for itself but
also for the Schengen states, and that the Schengen states would
exercise controls at their external borders not only for the states
constituting the Schengen area but also for the UK.
It would require that the UK participates fully in the SIS, i.e.,
that it has access to alerts entered by the Schengen states on
persons whose entry to the Schengen area has to be refused and
that it can, if it deems it appropriate, enter alerts in the SIS on
persons whose entry in the UK and the Schengen area should be
refused. Certain details would have to be worked out, such as the
recognition, by the Schengen states, of a valid UK visa for transit
purposes, in the same manner as the UK already recognizes
Schengen visas for purposes of transit through the UK.
The provisions of the "external borders" Schengen acquis to
be made applicable in order to let the UK participate in the
external border regime can probably remain limited to Council
Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 Establishing a European Agency for
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member States of the European Union
("FRONTEX Regulation"), 69 Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of the
European Parliament and the Council Establishing a Community
Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons Across
Borders ("Schengen Borders Code"), 70 and Regulation (EC)
863/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council
Establishing a Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid Border
Intervention Teams ("RABITs") and amending the FRONTEX
69. Council Regulation 2007/2004/EC Establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States
of the European Union 2004 O.J. L 349/1 [hereinafter FRONTEX Regulation].
70. European Parliament and Council Regulation 562/2006/EC Establishing a
Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons across Borders,
2006 O.J. L 105/1 [hereinafter Schengen Borders Code].
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Regulation as Regards that Mechanism and Regulating the Tasks
and Powers of Guest Officers.71 Moreover, the UK could be
entitled to participate in, and draw from, the Union's "External
Border Fund," which was set up by Decision 574/2007/EC of the
European Parliament and the Council.72 With respect to the
"Schengen Borders Code," exception would have to be made for
the provisions dealing with "internal borders" (Article 1(1) and
Title III). And some further editorial adjustments would have to
be agreed upon, which could probably be addressed in an
authorizing Council decision pursuant to Article 4 of the
Schengen Protocol.
It is clear that according to this scenario, the UK would be
entitled to have access to, and become a user of, the SIS in full.
To that end, the provisions governing the development,
establishment and functioning of SIS 11, from which the UK has
thus far been excluded, would have to be made applicable to it.
Moreover, it would also become fully involved in the activities of
the FRONTEX agency by having a member in its Management
Board (rather than an observer as is presently the case) and
would fully participate in further legislative developments
concerning that agency. It would also be able to participate in
the legislation of the Union on security standards for passports of
EU citizens.
It cannot be argued that becoming bound by the Schengen
acquis rules on external border controls would require the UK to
lower the level of controls it is presently exercising at its borders
on the basis of its national laws. The Schengen standards are very
high indeed in this respect. But they are based and will remain
based on the principle that the exercise of external border
controls is primarily a responsibility of the Member States, to be
carried out by the services of the Member States concerned,
combining the need to protect the security interests of the
controlling Member State with that of protecting the security
collective interests of the other Member States. It is true that this
aspect of taking care of the interests of others may preclude a
71. European Parliament and Council Regulation 863/2007/EC Establishing a
Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and Amending
Council Regulation No. 2007/2004 as Regards that Mechanism and Regulating the
Tasks and Powers of Guest Officers, 2007 O.J. L 199/30.
72. Parliament and Council Decision No. 574/2007/EC (External Borders Fund),
2007 O.J. L 144/22.
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Member State from unilaterally deciding to relax controls at its
external border. And if it would be a particular concern of the
UK to retain the right to take such unilateral decisions, then the
Schengen states should find comfort in the fact that the checks at
internal borders between them and the UK will not have been
abolished and that they remain therefore able to protect their
own, collective security interests.
B. Second Scenario: Visa Policy
A second scenario, which may or may not be combined with
the first, might be that the UK decides to take part in the
provisions of the Schengen acquis that establish a common visa
policy. In this area, the legislation is composed of four clusters:
First, the legislation determining the lists of third states whose
nationals must have a visa in order to enter the Schengen area
and those whose nationals are exempted from such obligation
(Regulation 539/2001 and its subsequent modifications).7
Second, the legislation introducing the uniform "Schengen" visas
and their technical specifications.74 Third, the complete set of
73. See generally Council Regulation 539/2001/EC Listing the Third Countries
Whose Nationals Must Be in Possession of Visas When Crossing the External Borders
and Those Whose Nationals Are Exempt from that Requirement, 2001 O.J. L 81/1
[hereinafter Third-Country National Visas]. Subsequent amendments are found in
Council Regulation 2414/2001/EC Amending Regulation 539/2001/EC Listing the
Third Countries Whose Nationals Must Be in Possession of Visas When Crossing the
External Borders of Member States and Those Whose Nationals Are Exempt from that
Requirement, 2001 O.J. L 327/1; Council Regulation 453/2003/EC Amending
Regulation 539/2001/EC Listing the Third Countries Whose Nationals Must Be in
Possession of Visas When Crossing the External Borders and Those Whose Nationals Are
Exempt from that Requirement, 2003 O.J. L 69/10; Council Regulation 851/2005/EC
Amending Regulation 539/2001/EC Listing the Third Countries Whose Nationals Must
Be in Possession of Visas When Crossing the External Borders and Those Whose
Nationals Are Exempt from that Requirement as Regards the Reciprocity Mechanism,
2005 O.J. L 141/3; Council Regulation 1932/2006/EC Amending Regulation
539/2001/EC Listing the Third Countries Whose Nationals Must Be in Possession of
Visas When Crossing the External Borders and Those Whose Nationals Are Exempt
from that Requirement, 2006 O.J. L 405/23; and Council Regulation 1244/2009/EC
Amending Regulation 539/2001/EC Listing the Third Countries Whose Nationals Must
Be in Possession of Visas When Crossing the External Borders and Those Whose
Nationals Are Exempt from that Requirement, 2009 O.J. L 336/1.
74. See Council Regulation 1683/95/EC Laying Down a Uniform Format for Visas,
1995 O.J. L 164/1; Council Regulation 334/2002/EC Amending Regulation
1683/95/EC Laying Down a Uniform Format for Visas, 2002 O.J. L 53/2; Council
Regulation 856/2008/EC Amending Regulation 1683/95/EC Laying Down a Uniform
Format for Visas as Regards the Numbering of Visas, 2008 O.J. L 235/1.
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rules codified in the Community Visa Code setting out the
procedures and conditions for issuing short-term visas.75 Finally
the legislation creating VIS and describing its functioning.76
The possible participation of the UK in provisions of the
Schengen acquis in the area of visa policy does not necessarily
have to cover all these four clusters. One could imagine a
participation in the cluster concerning the lists of countries
whose nationals need visas and those whose nationals do not,
without participating in any of the other clusters. This, for
instance, would make sense in the context of a participation in
the provisions of the Schengen acquis on controls at external
borders. It would certainly be helpful for those who have to
exercise these controls not to be obliged to work with different
lists, depending on the declared destination of the persons who
seek entry into the Schengen area.
It is true that there are still some differences between the
lists of the EU and those of the UK, but these differences seem to
have become less and less significant over the years. Indeed the
lists are to a very large extent identical. The main differences are
that (1) the UK (still) requires visas from nationals of certain
Western Balkan states, which the Union has recently decided to
move to the visa-free list and, (2) the EU requires Schengen
states to submit nationals from a number of small or thinly
populated, rather exotic countries, nearly all of which belong to
the Commonwealth of Nations, to the visa obligation, whereas
the UK does not.77 This may be a substantial number of states,
but the size of their population is very modest indeed and none
75. European Parliament and Council Regulation 810/2009/EC Establishing a
Community Code on Visas (Community Code), 2009 O.J. L 243/1.
76. European Parliament and Council Regulation 767/2008/EC Concerning the
Visa Information System (VIS) and the Exchange of Data between Member States on
Short-Stay Visas (VIS Regulation), 2008 O.J. L 218/60.
77. This concerns nationals from Belize, Botswana, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati,
the Marshall Islands Micronesia, Montserrat, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, the Solomon Islands,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Compare List of Countries Requiring a
Schengen Visa, GREEK EMBASSY, http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/
Article.aspx?office= 11 &folder-79&article=20404 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011), with Visa
Requirements for the United Kingdom, U.K. BORDER AGENCY HOME OFFICE, http://www.
ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/immigrationlaw/immigrationrules/appendix
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
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of them poses a particular immigration or security risk to the
Schengen states.
Joining this visa cluster would imply joining the provisions
and policies of the Union on visa reciprocity, which limit of
course the scope of unilateral action by individual Member
States.78 Joining only this part of the Schengen visa acquis would
not require, and therefore not entail, the UK's access to the VIS.
That would be different if the UK would take part in the other
visa clusters. This should not be dismissed out of hand as entirely
unrealistic. One should realize that taking part in the provisions
of the Schengen acquis on the establishment of the uniform visa,
applicable to the entire territory of all participating Member
States, and in the Community Visa Code, which applies to the
issuing of uniform Schengen visas, would not exclude the right of
the UK to continue issuing national visas, applicable to its
territory only (and possibly that of Ireland), having a longer term
of validity (up to six months, as is presently the case for UK short-
term visas) and against a higher fee than Schengen visas. Thus
whether a Schengen visa or a national UK visa would be issued
would basically depend on the travel intentions of the individual
visa applicant at a UK consulate.
Participating in the provisions on the uniform short-term
Schengen visas and the Community Visa Code makes
participation in the cluster governing the VIS a matter of course.
It is true that data may only be entered into the VS if they are
related to applications for Schengen visas, i.e., short-term visas
with a maximum validity of up to three months, and that no data
related to applications for national visas may be entered.
However, there is nothing in the existing regulation that
precludes the possibility for visa-issuing authorities to consult the
VIS when processing applications for national, territorially
limited visas.
Moreover, there would no longer be any legal obstacle for
the competent authorities of the UK to have direct access to data
held in the VIS for purposes other than issuihg visas and
controlling the identity of visa holders when presenting
themselves at an external border. This would include law
enforcement authorities and authorities responsible for dealing
78. See Council Regulation 851/2005/EC, supra note 73, art. 1, at 4.
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with asylum application. It seems that on balance, therefore,
there would be many advantages for the UK in participating in
the entire visa area of the Schengen acquis.
C. Third Scenario: Expulsion Policy
A third scenario would focus on the provisions of the
Schengen acquis on expulsion. The Schengen Convention of
1990 contained some sketchy provisions on this subject in its
Articles 23 and 24, but these have in the meantime been replaced
by the "Returns Directive."79 This directive has a hybrid character
in that it applies to the return both of third-country nationals
who do not or no longer fulfil the conditions for entry set out in
Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code and of third-country
nationals who do not or no longer fulfil "other" conditions for
entry, stay, or residence in the Member State where they are
present. This means that the directive belongs to the Schengen
acquis only to the extent that it covers the first group of third-
country nationals. This appears clearly in the recitals addressing
the respective positions of the Schengen associated states
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) and of the UK
and Ireland.
The relevant recital on the position of the UK reads as
follows:
To the extent that it applies to third-country nationals
who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the conditions of
entry in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code, this
Directive constitutes a development of provisions of the
Schengen acquis in which the United Kingdom does not take
part, in accordance with Council Decision 2000/365/EC of
29 May 2000 concerning the request of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take part in some
of the provisions of the Schengen acquis; moreover, in
accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the
position of the United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the
Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing
the European Community, and without prejudice to Article 4
79. See Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and Council on
Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying
Third-Country Nationals, 2008 O.J. L 348/98 [hereinafter Returns Directive];
Implementing Convention, supra note 10, art. 23-24, 2000 0.J. L 239, at 24.
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of the said Protocol, the United Kingdom is not taking part
in the adoption of this Directive and is therefore not bound
by it in its entirety or subject to its application.8 0
The decision of the UK not to opt into the directive for its
"non-Schengen related" aspects has of course greatly facilitated
the task of the EU legislator, which would otherwise have been
forced to bring about an artificial "splitting" of the original
proposal into two separate acts, one fully developing the
Schengen acquis, in which the UK would not take part, and one
not "Schengen related," in which it would.8'
This would have clearly brought to light the fact that one of
the objects of the directive, the introduction of the possibility, or
in some cases, the obligation of imposing entry bans in respect of
third-country nationals against whom return decisions have been
taken 82-irrespective of whether they do not, or no longer, fulfil
conditions under the Schengen Borders Code, or under national
law only-can only be effectively enforced by entering alerts on
these persons in the SIS for purposes of refusing their entry.
Recital (18) sets this out clearly:
Member States should have rapid access to information
on entry bans issued by other Member States. This
information sharing should take place in accordance with
Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the
establishment, operation and use of the second generation
Schengen Information System (SIS II).83
And it is precisely Regulation 1987/2006 that deals with the
operation of the SIS for purposes of immigration controls and by
which the UK is at present not bound. 4 Without being able to
enter alerts in the SIS on persons for purposes of refusing entry
nor to have access to such alerts entered by other Member States,
80. See Returns Directive, supra note 79, 2008 O.J. L 348/98, 26 (footnote
omitted).
81. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN UNION, WRITTEN EVIDENCE,
Memorandum by Brendan Donnelly, 2007-08, H.L. 62-II, 6 (U.K), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/1d200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/
62wed07.htm.
82. See Returns Directive, supra note 79, art. 11, 2008 O.J. L 348, at 103-04.
83. See id. 18 (footnote omitted).
84. European Parliament and Council Regulation 1987/2006/EC on the
Establishment, Operation and Use of the Second Generation Schengen Information
System (SIS II), 2006 O.J. L 381/4.
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it would not make much sense for the UK to take part in the
directive.
However, that would become different if, as suggested under
the first scenario, the UK would take part in the external borders
acquis and, as a result, in the SIS in its entirety. It could then be
in a position, at least from a point of view of practical
implementation, to take part also in the Returns Directive.
However, participation in that directive should cover its entire
scope, including its application to third-country nationals who do
not or no longer fulfil the conditions of national law for entry,
stay, or residence in the UK. Thus, an authorization by the
Council in response to a UK request under Article 4 of the
Schengen Protocol should go together with a UK "opt in" under
Article 4 of the Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom
and Ireland in Respect of the Area of Freedom, Security, and
Justice.
If the participation in the operation of the SIS in its entirety
would be a prerequisite for UK participation in the Returns
Directive, the reverse is not necessarily true. If the UK, for
reasons of its own, would prefer not to become bound by the
Returns Directive, this should not be an obstacle to its full
participation in the external border acquis and the SIS.
Obviously, the latter participation implies that the UK would be
able to give effect to alerts in the SIS that have been entered for
purposes of refusing the entry of the persons concerned when
they present themselves at an external border control post, and,
indeed, to have them removed when they are found within UK
territory. But it might be accepted that the UK does so on the
basis of the provisions of its national laws rather than the Returns
Directive.
D. Fourth Scenario: Free Movement Rights for Third-Country
Nationals
The fourth and last scenario would be of particular interest
to "the citizen"-not the EU citizens but citizens of third
countries who legally reside in a Member State. With the
abolition of checks on persons at internal borders the Schengen
acquis has also introduced a right of free movement for legally
residing or staying third-country nationals. This right is not as far
reaching as that which Community law already had created for
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nationals of the Member States, first for workers and service
providers and their family members, later for other categories
like students, pensioners, and eventually for all citizens of the
Union, but it grants a right to move freely within the territories of
the Member States for an uninterrupted period for up to three
months.
For holders of a Schengen visa, this right is inherent in
having been granted such visa. For visitors who do not need visas,
this right has been established in Article 20 of the Implementing
Convention; and for third-country nationals legally residing in a
Member State this right has been enacted in Article 21 of the
same convention. As far as the latter category is concerned,
whether or not they have the nationality of a state whose
nationals need a visa in order to enter the Schengen area, it
suffices that they hold a valid residence permit issued by the
Member State of residence and a valid passport. No visas are
necessary for them to travel within the Schengen area and indeed
to return to the Schengen area if they have made a journey
elsewhere.
Article 21 of the Implementing Convention has been
amended recently by Regulation 265/2010 to oblige Members
States to issue residence permits to third-country nationals who
entered their country with a national long-stay visa, at the latest
after a year.85 In the meantime, the holders of long-stay visas can
freely move on that basis within the Schengen area on the same
terms as holders of residence permits.
At present the UK does not participate in this element of the
Schengen acquis. Third-country nationals legally residing in one
of the Schengen states need a visa when they want to visit the UK
if they are nationals of a country whose nationals would otherwise
need visas for entry to the UK And vice versa, third-country
nationals legally residing in the UK need a Schengen visa in
order to visit any Member State or Schengen-associated state.
This is a situation that seems hard to justify, generates
incomprehension and irritation, and could be easily remedied, if
the UK and the Schengen states had the political will to do so.
85. European Parliament and Council Regulation 265/2010/EU Amending the
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulation 562/2006/EC as
Regards Movement of Persons with a Long-Stay Visa art. 1, 2010 0.J. L 85/1, at 2.
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Of course accepting residence permits instead of visas
requires agreed, high standards for their production, including
the application of biometric data (which exist and are agreed by
the Council for all Member States, including the UK).86
Moreover, there should be an obligation for issuing Member
States to take holders back even if the permits expired after
having entered the territory of another Member State. But all this
is self-evident and applies at present within the Schengen area.
CONCLUSION
If all four of these scenarios were realized, the UK would be
part of the entire Schengen acquis with the exception of its single
fundamental objective, which is spelled out in Article 1(1) of the
Schengen Borders Code: "This Regulation provides for the
absence of border control of persons crossing the internal
borders between the Member States of the European Union."87 It
would have accepted all "compensatory" measures but not the
keystone these measures are designed to counterweigh. That,
however, is a perspective for the very long run.
Even if the first three scenarios would be three bridges too
far for the moment,88 i.e., even if the UK would not join the
86. Cf Council Regulation 380/2008/EC Amending Regulation 1030/2002/EC
Laying Down a Uniform Format for Residence Permits for Third-Country Nationals 2008
0.]. L 115/1, 11 2, 3, 5, 7; Council Regulation 1030/2002/EC Laying Down a Uniform
Format for Residence Permits for Third-Country Nationals, 2002 O.J. L 157/1.
87. Schengen Borders Code, supra note 70, art. 1(1), at 3.
88. Recently, the government of the UK has presented a "European Union Bill,"
which would ensure that in the future the Parliament and the British people have their
say on any proposed transfer of powers to the European Union. It would require that
any proposed, future EU treaty that seeks to transfer areas of power or competence from
the UK to the European Union would be subject to a referendum and that the use of
"ratchet" clauses or "passerelles" provided by the existing Treaties, which allow the rules
of the EU to be modified or expand without the need of a formal treaty change, would
require an act of Parliament before the government could agree to its use. At the time of
writing this article it is not clear whether the announced legislation would affect the way
in which the UK could operate its opt-in rights under both the Protocol on the Position
of the United Kingdom and Ireland in Respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice, and the Schengen Protocol. Of course, accepting to become bound by Union
law would imply a transfer of powers, previously exercised by the UK on its own behalf,
to the Union, but the possibility of such a transfer has already been foreseen since the
Amsterdam Treaty. Moreover, it would be hard to consider opt-in rights as "ratchet"
clauses or "passerelles" because they do not imply a modification or expansion of the
rules, powers, or competences of the EU as provided by the present Treaties. But it is of
course up to the British legislator to define the terms and modalities of the procedures
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Schengen acquis on the management of controls at external
borders (while retaining border controls on travellers arriving
from Schengen states), would notjoin the Schengen acquis in any
of its visa parts, and would not join in the Returns Directive, it
could and should make an effort to join the provisions on free
movement of legally residing third-country nationals (again,
while fully retaining border controls on such persons arriving
from Schengen states). Similarly, the Schengen states could and
should make an effort to make it possible for third-country
nationals legally residing in the UK to come and cross the
English Channel (by train, by plane, or train and car) for a short
visit to "the continent," on the basis of their British residence
permit and a valid passport of their nationality, without being
required to obtain a Schengen visa. And of course, they will be
subject to border checks when arriving (and even when leaving),
and their passport will be stamped. And some of them may be
refused entry (because there is an alert on them in the SIS or in a
national list of alerts). But for most, it would be just a blessing.
An important obstacle, or nuisance, to visiting family,
coming to do business, enjoying a holiday, or just attending a
football or even a cricket match would be eliminated. And
people will be grateful to "Europe." How is that?
which govern the UK's participation in the EU's policies in the area of freedom, security
and justice. See European Union Bill, 2011, H.C. Bill [139] cl. 2-4, 6.
